




UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The Under Secretary for International Trade
Washington, D.C. 20230

Rec'd 13 Aug.



August 11, 1981

NFAC 5062-81

Honorable William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

I believe that the diversion of Western technology to the Soviet Union and to other potentially hostile governments must be made a matter of urgent attention by this Administration. The magnitude of the problem and the serious threat it poses to our national security persuades me that, among other things, we should enlist the support of the private sector and obtain better cooperation from our allies. This is essential if we are to make real progress towards stopping what can fairly be described as a 10-year hemorrhage.

The support of the intelligence community is necessary in at least two respects:

1. It is capable of providing unique information as to plans and activities of those who engage in industrial espionage; and,
2. It can determine what information can properly be released to the public.

We are developing ideas which may help you shape the targeting of intelligence resources. Internally, we are planning to engage allied support for tighter control of the licensing process and we are immediately expanding our own Export Licensing Division to include a new "Office of Compliance" in San Francisco. But in addition to these measures, I believe that an important part of our efforts should be sharing information about this threat with the American industrial and scientific communities and with foreign trade officials in friendly governments.


What this contemplates is a concerted and sustained publicity campaign involving press releases and speeches as well as private meetings with industrial and scientific leaders. The International Trade Administration can and should play a leading role: for example, there are many opportunities each week where we meet with or speak before groups in the U.S. and abroad which could probably be made as concerned as we are with this threat and would be willing to do something about it -- if properly informed.



2.

Could I have your reaction and, if you agree, would you please designate someone to work with us in developing such a program?

Sincerely,



Lionel H. Olmer

RECEIVED

MAR 11 1960


OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

August 13, 1981

NOTE FOR [REDACTED]

NFAC Technology Transfer Referent

VIA: C/AG/ES/OSWR



would like you to prepare a reply for the DCI to send to Commerce. He suggests you send them what you pulled together for the "backgrounder" (?). Commerce then can send it around.

I'll need the reply by COB Thursday the 20th. Thanks.

27th



EA/DD/NFAC

cc: D/OER

HAND CARRY

Was not hand carried, but
came in the mail, Received
in AG 17 Aug 11:00

ACTION

25X1

25X1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

UFA

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DD/NFA	X			
5	DD/A				
6	DD/O		X		
7	DD/S&T				
8	GC		X		
9	LC				
10	IG				
11	Compt				
12	D/PA				
13	D/EE0				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/ExStf				
16	AO/DCI				
17	Ch/NIC		X		
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		21 August			
		Date			

Remarks:

Please prepare response for DCI's signature.

Executive Secretary

13 Aug 81

Date

3637 (12-77)

25X1